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Abstract 
  
A preference to name stereotypically masculine before stereotypically feminine 
individuals explains why men are typically named before women, as on the internet, 
for example (Study 1).  Heterosexual couples are named with men’s names first 
more often when such couples are imagined to conform to gender stereotypes 
(Studies 2 & 3).  First named partners of imaginary same-sex couples are attributed 
more stereotypically masculine attributes (Study 4).   Familiarity bounds these effects 
of stereotypes on name order.  People name couples they know well with closer 
people first (Study 5), and consequently name familiar heterosexual couples with 
members of their own gender first (Study 6).   These studies evidence a previously 
unknown effect of the semantics of gender stereotypes on sentence structure in the 
everyday use of English.  
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William Shakespeare never wrote plays titled ‘Juliet and Romeo,’ ‘Cressida and 
Troilus,’ or ‘Cleopatra and Anthony.’  Had he done so, he would have flouted the 
prescriptions of grammarians of his time who advised that “in speaking at the leaste, 
let us kepe a natural order, and set the man before the woman for manners sake” 
(Wilson, 1553, cited in Bodine, 1975).   In the 16th and 17th centuries, English 
grammarians argued for the correctness, naturalness, and propriety of naming men 
before women on the grounds that men were the worthier and the more 
comprehensive sex (Bodine, 1975).  Few psychologists are familiar with this history 
of proscribing a male-first order in binomial phrases (Malkiel, 1959) such as ‘king and 
queen,’ ‘his and hers,’ ‘Mr. and Mrs.,’ or the names of romantic couples in the titles of 
Shakespeare’s plays.  To our knowledge, Roger Brown (1986, p. 484) is the only 
psychologist who has ever described the prescription to name men before women as 
a case of sexist language.   
 
We think that Brown (1986) was right, and his recognition went unacknowledged.  
Specifically, we propose that while the original sexist prescriptions to name men 
before women may be largely forgotten, gender stereotypes continue to affect how 
people order the names of romantic partners.  Indeed, far from being a phenomenon 
of the past, such effects are evident in very modern contexts, such as internet 
websites and the naming of lesbian and gay couples.  Our hypothesis that gender 
stereotypes affect the ordering of names draws together social psychological 
research on gender stereotypes, cognitive and linguistic studies of word order, and 
recent findings that gender stereotypes affect the ordering of visual representations 
of women and men in pictures (Maass, Suitner, Favaretto, & Cignacchi, 2009) and 
graphs (Hegarty, Lemieux, & McQueen, in press).    
 
 
Gender Stereotypes 
Gender stereotypes are belief structures that describe physical attributes, interests, 
occupations, and sexual orientations as if they all made up a single dimension; 
masculinity-femininity (Deaux & Lewis, 1984).  At their most basic level of meaning, 
these stereotypes both proscribe, and appear to explain, women’s and men’s 
assortment into unequal ‘homemaker’ and ‘breadwinner’ roles in the past, the 
 present, and in imagined alternate realities (Diekman & Eagly, 2000; Eagly, 1987; 
Hoffman & Hurst, 1990).  While social psychologists’ knowledge of the effects of 
gender stereotypes is too vast to be summarized here (but see Kite, Deaux, & 
Haines, 2008), three aspects of those stereotypes are particularly relevant to our 
hypotheses.   
 
First, at their most basic, gender stereotypes assume that femininity is made up of 
communal traits and masculinity of agentic traits (e.g., Deaux & Lewis, 1984; Eagly, 
1987).  These contents of gender stereotypes may be relevant to word order effects 
because both memory experiments (McDonald, Bock, & Kelly, 1993) and analysis of 
linguistic corpora (Benor & Levy, 2006) show that speakers of English prefer to 
construct binomial phrases with agentic entities before passive entities (e.g., ‘people 
and things’ or ‘living and dead’ see also Cooper & Ross, 1975).   Consequently, we 
predicted that people stereotyped as masculine would be named before people 
stereotyped as feminine.  Second, our hypothesis emphasizes stereotypic 
masculinity-femininity rather than gender categories per se; stereotypic feminine and 
masculine behaviours, roles, traits, and preferences activate stereotypic associations 
more than gender categories do (Deaux & Lewis, 1984; Pratto & Bargh, 1991).  For 
example, gay men and lesbians are stereotyped as “feminine” and “masculine” 
respectively by virtue of their respective orientations towards male and female 
partners, even though gay men are men and lesbians are women (Kite & Deaux, 
1987, see also Butler, 1990; Hegarty & Pratto, 2001).   Consequently, our hypothesis 
makes predictions as to how both same-sex and opposite-sex couples are named.  
Third, like all stereotypes, gender stereotypes are most likely to be active when little 
individuating information is known about the target (Deaux & Major, 1987; Fiske & 
Neuberg, 1990).  Consequently, we predict that effects of gender stereotypes on 
name order will occur when wholly unfamiliar couples are named, but not when 
familiar couples are named.   
 
It may seem odd to predict that gender stereotypes could affect something as 
seemingly abstract and asocial as word order.  However, our hypothesis is further 
motivated by recent research on the effects of gender stereotypes on the visual 
ordering of information in pictures and graphs.   Speakers of languages read from 
left-to-right, such as English, draw and interpret visual images from left-to-right 
(Chatterjee, Southwood, & Basilico, 1999; Maass & Russo, 2004).  Such people also 
position men to the left of women in pictures to the extent that they stereotype men 
as more agentic than women (Maass et al., 2009).  Similarly, data representing men 
is spontaneously graphed first, ahead of data representing women, and powerful 
groups are graphed ahead of weaker groups (Hegarty & Buechel, 2006: Hegarty, 
Lemieux, & McQueen, in press).   Indeed, Maass et al. (2009) theorized preferences 
for ordering the genders in images are causally related to the tendency to position 
agents before subjects in human languages.  In this context, our hypothesis that 
gender stereotypes affect word order appears considerably less surprising.  
 
 
 
Linguistic Explanations of Name Order Preferences 
We are not the first social scientists to attempt to explain a preference to name men 
before women.  Linguists have highlighted two plausible reasons why men’s names 
might habitually go before women’s: name phonology and name popularity.   In 
English, men’s names typically contain fewer syllables than women’s names, are less 
likely to begin or end in vowels, and are more likely to begin and end in obstruent, 
harder-sounding consonants (Barry & Harper, 1995; Cassidy, Kelly & Sharoni, 1999; 
Cutler et al., 1990; Lieberson & Bell, 1992; Slater & Feinman, 1985).  These 
statistical differences may reflect different linguistic roots of female and male names 
 in English (Hough, 2000), and the differences are sufficiently robust that 
connectionist models, human children, and human adults can all consistently predict 
the gender of real and nonsense names (Cassidy et al., 1999; Lieberson & Mikelson, 
1995; Whisell, 2001). Phonological differences between female and male English 
names have been hypothesized to be both a cause (Wright, Hay & Bent, 2005) and a 
consequence (Cutler, McQueen, & Robinson, 1990) of the preference to address 
men before women. 
 
Female and male names in English also vary in popularity.  The most popular male 
names are given to more children than are the most popular female names 
(Lieberson & Bell, 1992), and more girls than boys are assigned original unique 
names (Lieberson & Mikelson, 1995).  These differences emerge, in part, because 
girls are more often named on the basis of name aesthetics, and boys are more often 
named for an older family member (Rossi, 1965).  Consequently, male names remain 
popular across decades more consistently than do female names (Lieberman, 
Dumais, & Bauman, 2000).  These differences in name popularity might explain 
name order preferences; binomial phrases tend to position common words before 
uncommon words, both when word order has become fixed (Fenk-Oczlon, 1989), 
and when word order remains variable (Benor & Levy, 2006).   
 
The most sustained linguistic analysis of the preference to name men before women 
was offered by Wright, Hay and Bent (2005).  These authors argued that a 
‘phonological conspiracy’ leads men to be named before women, and found evidence 
that men’s names tend to go before women’s on the internet (see also Wright & Hay, 
2002). Wright et al. (2005) were informed by Cooper and Ross’ (1975) claims about 
the phonological characteristics of ‘linguistic freezes;’ those binomials in which the 
order of elements has become fixed and idiomatic (e.g., ‘salt and pepper,’ ‘gin and 
tonic,’ and ‘spic and span’).  Wright et al. (2005) asked students to express a 
preference for alternate forms of sentences that varied name order within a binomial 
phrase.  When the two names had similar phonology but different gender, students - 
particularly male students - preferred to position male names first.  For example, 
sentences containing the binomial phrase ‘John and Jen’ were preferred to 
sentences containing the binomial phrase ‘Jen and John.’ However, when names 
were matched for gender, participants preferred sentences which positioned more 
common names first, names with fewer syllables first, and names that began and 
ended with obstruent consonants first.  These phonological preferences for name 
order overlapped considerably with the phonological preferences for word order in 
linguistic freezes described by Cooper and Ross (1975).   
 
 
 
The Present Research 
To what extent does our stereotyping hypothesis overlap with Wright et al’s (2005) 
phonological conspiracy hypothesis?  The four experiments and two observational 
studies presented below point to similarities and differences.  First,  like  Wright and 
Hay (2002), we predicted that men’s names would be positioned before women’s on 
the internet (Study 1).  However, we have drawn different implications from Cooper 
and Ross’ (1975) statement on binomial phrases than Wright et al. (2005) did. 
Cooper and Ross (1975) emphasized that semantic rules would outweigh 
phonological rules in determining word order preferences, and the phonological rules 
they proposed have received only mixed support in memory experiments (McDonald 
et al., 1993; Pinker & Birdsong, 1978), and analyses of linguistic corpora (Bock & 
Levy, 2006; Fenk-Oczlon, 1989).  Our stereotyping hypothesis similarly predicts that 
semantics outweigh phonology and that men are named first to the extent that 
couples are perceived through the lens of gender stereotypes.  In two experiments 
 we manipulated the extent to which heterosexual couples were understood to 
conform to gender stereotypes to test this claim (Studies 2 & 3).      
Moreover, the gender stereotyping and phonological conspiracy hypothesis differ in 
that the former emphasizes stereotypical masculinity-femininity, while the latter 
emphasizes sex differences in the characteristics of names.  As a result, the gender 
stereotyping hypothesis makes unique predictions as to how same-sex couples will 
be named, and these predictions are tested in Study 4.   Finally, only the gender 
stereotyping hypothesis predicts that familiarity with the couple being named will 
moderate name order preferences.  Cooper and Ross (1975) laid particular stress 
upon a semantic “me first” rule; “here and there” is preferred to “there and here.” 
Name order may be affected by such a rule where a person feels closer to one 
member of a couple than the other.  In our last two studies we tested whether people 
name well-known heterosexual couples with closer individuals first, in a naturalistic 
setting (Study 5) and in an experiment (Study 6).  
 
 
Study 1: Name Order on the Internet  
 
Method  
The first study aimed simply to test whether there is a preponderance of pairings of 
female and male names on the internet with the male name positioned first.  Wright 
and Hay (2002) counted the number of ‘hits’ produced by 18 name pairs by an 
internet search in 1998 and found that combinations with male names first produced 
more hits.  We replicated their study with two larger sets of names here. The British 
set included the ten most popular names given to boys and the ten most popular 
names given to girls in 2004 in England and Wales (see Office of National Statistics, 
n.d., a, b, for actual names).  The second American set of names used the ten most 
popular female and male names from the 1990 United States census (see United 
States Census Bureau, n.d. for actual names).   No name occurred on both lists.  For 
each search, we recorded the number of ‘hits’ estimated by searches for webpages 
that contained conjunctions of each of the 100 possible female-male name pairs in a 
female-first binomial phrase (e.g., “Emily and Jack”) and a male-first binomial phrase 
(e.g., “Jack and Emily”), using the search engine www.google.com on November 8th, 
2005.   
 
 
Results and Discussion 
British searches produced, on average, 1,677 hits with male-first binomials but only 
467 hits with female-first binomials.  American searches yielded 13,428 hits on 
average with male-first binomials, but only 5,846 hits with female-first binomials.  For 
three of the British name pair combinations, equal numbers of hits were produced by 
searches with female-first and male-first binomials.  Otherwise, male-first binomials 
produced the greater number of hits among the British searches (N = 68), χ2 (1) = 
15.68, p <.001, and American searches (N = 77), χ2 (1) = 29.16, p <.001.  In other 
words, we replicated Wright and Hay’s (2002) findings.   
 
Study 2: Traditional and Non-Traditional Couples 
 
While the first study showed that male names are often positioned first, it did not 
inform the question of why names are ordered in this manner.  Study 2 was a simple 
experimental test of our hypothesis that gender stereotypes affect name order.  We 
hypothesized that male names would be positioned first more often when 
heterosexual couples were imagined to conform to gender stereotypes than when 
they were imagined to deviate from them.   
 
 Method 
Participants.  Eighty six women and 35 men participated at public campus venues (n 
= 79) or in class (n = 48) as volunteers (M age = 25.0, range = 18-60 years). Like all 
subsequent experiments, Study 3 was conducted at one of two English universities. 
 
Materials and Procedure.  In two conditions, participants read instructions to think of 
an imaginary heterosexual couple who “are quite [traditional/non-traditional], and who 
[conform strictly to/deviate radically from] gender scripts about how the two genders 
should behave.” In both conditions, participants were next asked a series of items 
which served as a manipulation check.  They indicated which partner earned more 
money, which did more housework, which was more interested in art, which was 
more interested in science and technology, which was more interested in sport, and 
which was more interested in fashion.  Responses that indicated the female partner 
for the second, third and sixth questions, and responses which indicated the male 
partner for the first, fourth and fifth questions indicated that the couple were imagined 
to conform to gender stereotypes.    
 
Next, participants were instructed to write down five name combinations for their 
imaginary couple.  This measure comprised the principle dependent variable.   
Participants completed the materials in class or at public campus venues and were 
subsequently debriefed. 
 
Results and Discussion 
To check that the manipulation had been effective, we calculated the proportion of 
stereotype conforming responses generated by each participant.  Non-traditional 
couples were stereotyped less than traditional couples (Ms = .44, .95 respectively), t 
(74) = 10.36, p <.001.1   A 2x2 ANOVA showed effects of both participant gender, F 
(1, 114) = 4.69, p <.05, η2 = .039, and condition, F (1, 114) = 5.55, p <.05, η2 = .046 
on the proportion of male names positioned first.   
 
We proceeded by analyzing the principle dependent variable next.  Men positioned 
men’s names first more than chance predictions, (M =.73), t (34) = 3.82, p =.001, but 
women did not, (M =.53), t < 1.  Traditional couples were named with men’s names 
first more often than chance predictions, (M =.69), t (60) = 3.67, p =.001, but non-
traditional couples were not (M =.49), t <1.  These two main effects did not interact, F 
<1.   These results support our hypothesis that gender stereotypes affect name 
order, suggesting that semantic beliefs rather than phonological characteristics affect 
name order. Furthermore, as in Wright et al.’s (2005) study, men preferred male-first 
orders more than women did.  We return to this gender difference below.   
 
Study 3: Name Order and Historical Time 
 
Study 3 was a conceptual replication of Study 2.  Diekman and Eagly (2000) 
observed that women and men are imagined to have inhabited more traditional 
gender roles in the past than in the present. Building on their work, we used historical 
time to operationalize imaginary couples’ conformity or deviation from traditional 
gender roles.  We predicted that couples imagined to live in earlier periods of history 
would be named with men first more often than couples imagined to live more 
recently.   
 
Method 
Participants.  Eighty women and 80 men participated in a university library (n = 96) or 
on-line (n = 64) as volunteers (mean age = 22.5 years, range = 18-66 years).   
 
 Materials and Procedure.  The study was presented as an investigation of “people’s 
awareness of popular names from different time periods.”   In four conditions, 
participants were asked to imagine “writing a story about a couple living in [the 
1920s/1950s/1980s/the 21st century]” and to list “ten couples’ names that you think 
may suit the couple you are imagining.”   
 
The paper version of the survey was distributed in a university library.   An invitation 
to complete the online version was distributed to undergraduate students.   An email 
contact for debriefing was provided in both contexts.  The internet site was closed 
once the design had been filled.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Overall, participants positioned male names first more often than chance predictions 
(M = .66), one-sample t (159) = 5.20, p < .001. A 2 x 4 ANOVA investigated effects of 
decade and participant gender on the proportion of male names positioned first.  A 
main effect of gender was observed, F (1,159) = 14.36, p < .001, η2 = .086.  As in 
Study 2, men positioned men’s names first more often than chance would predict (M 
=.73), t (79) = 6.60, p <.001, but women did not (M =.55), t (79) = 1.20, p >.20.  The 
effect of decade was not significant, F <1.1, but the interaction between decade and 
participant gender was significant, F (3, 152) = 5.85, p = .001, η2 = .104. Tukey’s 
post-hoc test revealed that women in the 1980s and 21st century conditions 
positioned men’s names first less than women in the other conditions, and less than 
men in all four conditions (see Table 1).   
 
In Study 3, the manipulation of historical time affected women’s, but not men’s, name 
order preferences.  As in Study 2, men were more likely to name couples with men 
first overall.  We examined gender differences in the naming of imaginary couples 
again in our final study, but first present the strongest test of our hypotheses that it is 
stereotypically masculine people, rather than men, who are named first when 
imaginary couples are called to mind.   
 
Study 4: Same-Sex Couples 
 
Heretofore, we have presented evidence that men are named before women when 
opposite-sexed couples are named because gender stereotypes affect name order 
preferences.  In Study 4 we asked people to imagine same-sex couples.  Gender 
stereotypes lead people to expect lesbian and gay people to have ‘gender inverted’ 
attributes (Kite & Deaux, 1987), but Study 4 required participants to attribute a series 
of stereotypically feminine and masculine attributes more to one partner of a same-
sex couple than to the other.  We predicted that first named partners would be 
attributed stereotypically masculine attributes, and that second named partners 
would be attributed stereotypically feminine attributes.   
 
Method 
Participants.  Forty seven women and 39 men participated in class (n = 42) or at 
public campus venues (n = 44) as volunteers (M age = 22.9, range = 18-57 years).  
 
Materials and Procedure.  Participants read instructions to think about either an 
imaginary lesbian or gay couple and to write names for their couple using the 
following stem: 
 
 My imaginary couple are called    and     
 
Six items then allowed participants to describe differences between the partners in 
their imaginary couple.  The items pertained to differences in annual earnings, 
 household labour, interest in sports, interest in fashion, physical smallness, and 
physical strength.  Items required the participants to write the partner’s names into 
comparative statements, endowing each attribute to one partner more than to the 
other.  For example, the final two items pertaining to physical attributes were 
presented as follows: 
 
   is physically smaller than    
   is physically stronger than    
 
The six items were written such that a participant who positioned one partner’s name 
first consistently across items would endow that partner with an equal number of 
stereotypically feminine and masculine attributes.  The performance of household 
labour, interest in fashion, and physical smallness were categorized as 
stereotypically feminine attributes.  High earnings, interest in sports and physical 
strength were categorized as stereotypically masculine attributes.  Participants 
completed the materials in class or at public campus venues and were subsequently 
debriefed. 
 
Results and Discussion. 
Responses that stereotyped first named partners as ‘feminine’ were coded as 0 and 
those that stereotyped first named partners as ‘masculine’ were coded as 1.   All six 
items were averaged to form a reliable measure of the stereotypical masculinity of 
the first named partner, α = .76.  Consistent with predictions, first named partners 
were imagined to possess fewer feminine attributes and more masculine attributes 
than chance would predict (M = .38, .62 respectively), t (85) = 3.52, p = .001.  A 
2x2x2 ANOVA with couple gender (women vs. men), participant gender (women vs. 
men) and data collection site (classroom vs. public venue) showed no significant 
main effects or interactions that qualified this attribution of masculine attributes to the 
first named partner, all F < 1.  For each of the six stereotyping items, the 
stereotypically masculine attribute was attributed to the first named partner more than 
50% of the time, significantly more so in all cases except the earnings item, all other 
p <.01.    
 
These results support our hypothesis that name order is associated with beliefs 
about individuals’ stereotypically feminine and masculine traits rather than their 
status as women or men per se.  In sum, the last three studies suggest that modern 
English speakers do not follow a ‘male first’ rule when they name couples.  Rather, 
they align name order with the stereotypical masculinity-femininity of the two partners 
in a couple.  
 
Study 5: Christmas Cards 
           
The gender stereotyping and phonological conspiracy theory not only differ in their 
predictions about the naming of same-sex couples, they also make different 
predictions as to how familiarity moderates preferences for naming couples.  Study 5 
tests our hypothesis that when the couple named are highly familiar, that effects of 
stereotypes on name order are absent (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990).  To conduct Study 
5, we “shuttled back”, in Lewinian fashion, from the laboratory to the real world, to 
observe how people named couples that they knew well. In contrast to the 
anonymous medium of the internet, Study 5 examined how couples are addressed in 
Christmas cards exchanged between friends and family. In this context - and in 
contrast to both the internet and earlier experiments, interpersonal closeness may 
play a role in name order preferences.  Hence we predicted that name order 
preferencs would follow a ‘me first’ rule (Cooper & Ross, 1975) rather than gender 
stereotypes, and that people would address closer people first in Christmas cards.   
 Method 
Informants and Procedure  Seventeen people who were married to, or co-habiting 
with, an opposite-sex partner acted as volunteer informants (Age range = 36-79 for 
female partners, and 38-85 for male partners, Ms = 53.82, 54.82 respectively).  
Informants were not ‘research participants’ in the sense traditional to psychological 
research.  Informants helped us to interpret the naming behaviour of their friends and 
family, but we did not study their naming behaviour at all.  Specifically, prior to the 
2007 (n = 13) or 2008 (n = 4) Christmas season, each informant agreed to retain 
every Christmas card they received.  Each informant subsequently sorted the cards 
into piles that were sent by a person or family that knew the informant best, knew 
their partner best, or who know both partners equally well.  We then investigated 
name order in the cards that were sent by someone who was closer to one of the two 
partners, and we debriefed the informants about the study’s purpose. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Each informant supplied 7-53 cards, and a total of 492 cards were sent by individuals 
or families who were closer to either an informant or to their partner.  More cards 
were sent by people who were closer to female partners than male partners (N = 327 
vs. 165 respectively), χ2 (1) = 53.34, p <.001.   As predicted, most cards named the 
better-known partner rather than the less well-known partner first.  This pattern 
emerged whether the better-known partner was the female partner (N = 301, 26), χ2 
(1) = 231.27, p <.001, or the male partner, (N = 132, 35), χ2 (1) = 56.34, p <.001.  No 
preference to name men first was observed.  Rather, a ‘me-first’ rule (Cooper & 
Ross, 1975) described 88% of the cards that informants received.   These results 
confirm our predictions that well-known couples are named in ways that are affected 
by interpersonal closeness and not by gender stereotypes.   
 
           Study 6: Naming Friends, Family and Imaginary Couples 
 
The Study 5 informants received many cards from other couples and families, but the 
identity of the person who actually wrote each card was difficult to discern.  As a 
result, we were unable to tell whether women and men differed in the ways that they 
addressed the informants and their partners. In our final study, we aimed to further 
examine how name order preferences are moderated by familiarity with the couple 
being named, and to examine whether preferences to name closer people first would 
lead to gender difference in the naming of familiar couples.  Women and men form 
more close friendships with members of the same sex than with members of the 
opposite sex (Caldwell & Peplau, 1982). Consequently, a me-first rule should lead 
people to name same-sex individuals first when naming familiar heterosexual 
couples.  In Study 6, women and men named familiar couples and imaginary couples 
to test both the hypothesis that naming preferences were moderated by familiarity, 
and the hypothesis that familiar couples are named with same-sex people first.   
 
Method 
Participants.  Thirty nine women and 38 men participated at public campus venues 
as volunteers (M age = 26.7, range = 17-50 years).   
 
Materials and Procedure.  Materials asked participants to write the names of four 
couples in their family, four couples among their friends, and the names of four 
imaginary couples.   Participants were approached on campus, invited to participate, 
and subsequently debriefed. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Table 2 shows the proportion of couples of each type that women and men named by 
listing men’s names first.  A 3x2 ANOVA with couple type (family vs. friends vs. 
 imaginary) as a within-subject factor, participant gender (female vs. male) as a 
between-subjects factor, and the proportion of couples with men’s names first as the 
dependent variable revealed several effects.  Men named a greater proportion of 
couples with men’s names first than women did (Ms = .69, .40 respectively), F (1, 75) 
= 33.61, p <.001, η2 =.309.  These proportions also varied by task, F (1, 75) = 10.18, 
p <.001, η2 =.119, and the effects of task and gender interacted, F (1, 75) = 4.17, p 
<.05, η2 =.052.   Tukey’s post hoc test (α = .05) revealed that women named men 
first more often when naming imaginary couples than when naming friends or family 
members.  Men named men first with equal frequency across all three tasks. 
 
As in Studies 2 and 3, imaginary heterosexual couples were named with men’s 
names first, particularly by men.  However, when participants named familiar couples 
first, same-sex people were named first, consistent with a ‘me first’ preference.  This 
latter effect may partially explain why gender differences in the naming of imaginary 
people were observed in this study, and in earlier studies (i..e., Wright et al., 2005; 
Studies 2 & 3).  When asked to imagine couples, women and men may draw on the 
names of familiar couples as one way of completing such tasks.  Responding in this 
manner would lead women to name women first and men to name men first when 
naming opposite-sexed couples.  Consistent with this explanation, positive 
correlations were observed in Study 6 between the proportion of male names 
positioned first when naming friends and kin, r (77) = .49, p <.001, friends and 
imaginary couples,  r (77) = .50, p <.001, and kin and imaginary couples, r (77) = .38, 
p =.001.2    
 
General Discussion 
 
Many centuries ago, English language speakers were proscribed to name men 
before women so that everybody’s language use would reflect a patriarchal order 
which was said to be natural and proper.  Contemporary speakers of English may not 
know the history of English grammar, but their implicit thoughts about gender groups 
and personal relationships continue to inform the way that they order names, both in 
experimental studies (Studies 2, 3, 4, & 6) and ‘real world’ contexts (Studies 1 & 5).  
Jointly these six studies lead to the conclusion that people habitually name men first 
in opposite-sex couples because male partners are believed to be more 
stereotypically masculine kinds of people than female partners (Studies 2 & 3).  
While somewhat counter-intuitive, this conclusion appears the most parsimonious 
explanation of the attribution of masculine attributes to the first named partner in 
same-sex couples (Study 4).  As in other domains, the effects of stereotypes on 
name order disappear when individuating information is rich (Study 5).   When 
naming familiar people, women and men position members of their own gender first 
most often (Study 6).   
 
Our analysis of name order preferences differs from earlier linguistic explanations of 
such preferences (Cutler et al., 1990; Wright et al., 2005).   Hypotheses based on 
static linguistic differences between women’s and men’s names are unable to explain 
the kinds of situational variation in name order preferences shown here.  As such, 
name order preferences exemplify a more general property of stereotyping; static 
group differences provide essentialist explanations (c.f., Medin, 1990) that only 
appear to explain why groups behave differently or ought to be treated differently 
(Hegarty & Pratto, 2001; Hoffman & Hurst, 1990; Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 
1997).  Female and male names differ statistically in popularity and phonology just as 
female and male bodies differ statistically in size, shape, longevity and other 
attributes.  However, such differences – whether linguistic or bodily - cannot account 
for the manner in which stereotyping is moderated with familiarity with the possible 
targets of stereotypes (c.f., Deaux & Major, 1987; Fiske & Neuberg, 1989).  Study 4 
 demonstrates most clearly that name order is associated with properties attributed to 
women and men, rather than properties inherent in women and men’s names. The 
fact that romantic partners usually have different genders from each other is neither a 
necessary (Study 4), nor a sufficient (Study 2), condition for the effects of gender 
stereotypes on name order to be observed. 
 
While our conclusions differ from Wright et al.’s (2005), some of these differences 
may be explained by differences in our methodologies. Speakers of British English, 
studied here, and of American English, in Wright et al.’s (2005) studies, may name 
couples differently.  Also, our participants called to mind names, while Wright et al.’s 
(2005) participants chose between two sentences with different name orders.  In their 
experiments participants may have been more likely to rehearse how each name 
order sounds before alighting on a preferred name order.  Phonological properties 
may affect choices of name orders to a greater extent in such choice tasks.  
Additionally, our experiments asked people to name couples, but Wright et al. (2005) 
did not describe the relationship between the women and men in their sentences.  
We are currently testing the degree to which couple status bounds the effects 
observed here in studies in which people imagine women and men who are friends 
or romantic partners.  Finally, while we reached different conclusions from Wright et 
al. (2005), we would like to point out that not have reached those conclusions without 
the benefit of their original thought-provoking work.  
 
In one regard, our results agree strongly with those of Wright et al. (2005);  any 
‘conspiracy’ to name men first is largely a conspiracy of men.  Male participants in 
Studies 2, 3, & 6 named imaginary couples with male names first 73-75% of the time, 
while female participants in these students wrote male names first only 53-55% of the 
time.3  Moreover, women were affected by our subtle historical cue about traditional 
gender roles while men were not (Study 3).  It seems unlikely that these gender 
difference result from men holding stronger gender stereotypes than women; such 
gender differences are rarely observed (Kite et al., 2008), and women and men 
stereotyped same-sex couples similarly here (Study 4).  Instead, women and men 
may draw on knowledge of well-known couples when naming imaginary couples, just 
as knowledge of familiar names is generalized to unfamiliar names in other contexts 
(Nuttin, 1987).  Such a process might explain the interaction of gender and historical 
time in Study 3; participants may have drawn on the names of couples that they 
know well to a greater extent when imagining couples in the present than in the 
distant past.  Alternatively women and men may have understood the relationship 
between historical time and gender stereotypes differently.  Diekman and Eagly 
(2000) found that participants of both genders stereotyped more modern women as 
more agentic than traditional women, while stereotypes of men differed less by 
historical period.  In Study 3 women may have stereotyped modern women as more 
agentic than women in the past to a greater extent than male participants did. 
 
These studies bear a family resemblance to other research demonstrating subtle 
effects of gender stereotypes on the ordering of information in pictures (Maass et al., 
2009) and graphs (Hegarty et al., in press).   However, we would caution against the 
interpretation that effects of gender stereotypes on order are manifestations of 
identical processes in verbal and visual domains.  To be sure, people prefer to 
position more agentic entities first in pictures (Maass et al., 2009) and in binomial 
phrases (McDonald et al., 1993).  Furthermore, Maass et al. (2009) argue that the 
subject-object order of human languages is partially responsible for the bias to 
position more agentic groups first in the left-right axis.   However, in contrast to the 
results of the experiments above, Hegarty et al. (in press) showed that powerful 
groups are positioned first in graphs, but masculine groups are not.  While first 
named partners in same-sex couples were attributed more masculine attributes in 
 Study 4, we have found that English-language speakers attribute feminine and 
masculine attributes equally to members of same-sex couples positioned on the left 
of images presented to them and images that they draw themselves (Hegarty, 2009).   
Finally, the gender differences observed here and in other studies of naming (Wright 
et al., 2009) are not consistently reported in studies of the ordering of imagery 
representing women and men in pictures and graphs (Hegarty et al., in press; Maass 
et al., 2009, but see also Suitner & Maass, 2007).    
 
A comparison of the effects of gender stereotypes on visual and verbal order also 
suggests the possibility of a reciprocal relationship between such stereotypes and 
name order.  People not only are quicker to identify the names of high power groups 
when they appear in the upper part of the visual field (Schubert, 2005), but they also 
attribute more power to an individual the further that individual is positioned vertically 
above others within a diagram (Geissner & Schubert, 2007).   Hegarty et al. (2009) 
showed a second way that ordering can contribute to stereotypes; people who 
attribute ‘bias’ to a graph’s author on the basis of the order of information in that 
graph assume that the author is biased in favour of the group graphed first.  
Accordingly, name order may do more than reflect the effects of gender stereotyped 
thoughts on language structure.  Name order may communicate gender stereotypes 
either directly by affecting listeners’ beliefs, or indirectly by affecting listeners’ beliefs 
about speakers’ beliefs. 
 
Conclusions 
Many centuries ago, English speakers were enjoined to name men before women on 
the basis of explicitly sexist beliefs about women and men (Bodine, 1975).  In a 
modern culture where such beliefs are seen as antiquated and wrong, the sexism 
that persists in likely to be subtle and unacknowledged in form (Swim, Aiken, Hall, & 
Hunter, 1995).   Indeed, behavioural preferences to make women the ‘second sex’ in 
both pictures and words appear to have outlived the largely forgotten patriarchal 
prescriptions for such conventions (see Hall, 2008 and Curzan, 2003 respectively). In 
this context, Brown’s (1984) overlooked recognition that word order might be a form 
of sexist language is all the more striking, and all the more relevant for contemporary 
understandings of sexist language.   
 
Notes 
1. The degrees of freedom reported for this t-test is less than n-1 because a 
Levene’s test for equality of variance showed the sample variance to be far 
greater in the non-traditional couple condition than in the traditional couple 
condition (S.D. = .38, .11 respectively), F (123) = 105.27, p <.001.   
 
2. These correlations were not mediated by participant gender, all |Z| < 1. 
 
3. Indeed, women may not contribute to the naming conspiracy at all.   In 
Studies 2, 3, and 6, each of the 205 women named imaginary couples with 
men first, on average, in 54.1% of their responses.  While consistently higher 
than .50 across the three studies, this proportion was not significantly higher 
than chance in any study, or even when the women’s data was collapsed 
across studies, t (204) = 1.54, p >.12.   
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and Imagined Decade (Study 3). 
            
Decade   1920s  1950s  1980s  21st 
Century 
Participant Gender  
     Female  .69*  .68*  .39  .42 
     Male  .63  .70**  .76***  .84***   
*p <.05, **p <.01, *p <.001.  Significance tests are two-tailed t-tests testing deviation 
from a theoretical mean of .50 within each cell.   
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and Couple Type (Study 5). 
          
Couple Type  Family  Friends Imaginary  
Participant Gender  
     Female  .34***  .32***  .55 
     Male  .62*  .73***  .74***   
*p <.05, ***p <.001.  Significance tests are two-tailed t-tests testing deviation from a 
theoretical mean of .50.
  
